Traditionally the creation of sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) was "supply-driven", the result of excess reserves from natural resources (e.g. Norway, Qatar, Kuwait, etc.) or non-commodity capital flows (e.g. South Korea, China, Singapore, etc.). More recently we observe many newly established or announced funds to be "demand-driven", motivated by domestic development objectives (including infrastructure development). This transition from supply-driven to demand-driven SWF creation is most starkly manifested in SWF capitalization. This paper outlines recent developments on SWF creation -especially by countries that are neither endowed with oil wealth nor possess sizeable export surpluses to create SWFs with a development mandate. While contextualizing this study in the broader SWF literature, the aim is to provide a comprehensive overview on how funding sources impact achieving long-term financial and socio-economic development objectives.
Introduction
Over 25 years ago, Robert Lucas asked a simple, but profound question: "Why doesn't capital flow from rich to poor countries?" (Lucas, 1990) Deemed the "paradox of capital", this question remains with us and its relevance over periods has become more pronounced. Consider the rapid accumulation of surpluses from commodity rents by some emerging economies. In many instances this capital was gathered into investment pools -so-called commodity funds, shielded from undeveloped domestic economies, and invested internationally in securities in well-developed financial markets, i.e flowing "uphill" from "poor" to "rich" countries.
In the formative period of commodity funds, the creation of these early sovereign wealth funds (SWF) was largely "supply-driven", motivated by the accumulation of commodity wealth, then later current account surpluses or even state commercial assets, which had outgrown the capacity of government bureaucrats to oversee effectively. However, since the global financial crisis, and more recently in the wake of commodity price declines and slowing growth in emerging economies, the establishment of fund structures has accelerated, not in response to rising surpluses, but in part has been spurred due to a slowdown in foreign investment. Their task is to restart economic growth, promote economic diversification, and advance national competitiveness. To emphasize, the creation of new funds has become "demand-driven", motivated less by the need to capture and invest surplus wealth, but to advance key -and some cases urgent -national economic policy goals (e.g. see Halland et al. 2016 ).
Financing economic restructuring and development -even with substantial surplus wealth -is challenging. Unless entirely sequestered, surpluses will certainly have competing uses. They might be "earmarked" to support both current and capital spending under central or local budgets or serve as critical buffers to maintain fiscal and balance of payments stability and by extension the international borrowing capacity of governments and local financial systems. Moreover, and specifically with regard to the IMF's definition of foreign exchange reserves (IMF, 2007) , reallocating foreign reserves (or "conscious -or unconscious -uncoupling" i ) beyond the reach of monetary authorities or investing them in illiquid assets -such as infrastructure -can directly impact the credit quality and financial capacity of the government.
This raises several critical public policy questions: How are development-focused SWFs capitalized so as to contribute effectively to their objectives, while avoiding risks that detract from or even destabilize a broader national development agenda? Will existing revenues or assets be repurposed?
Will governments employ leverage in more creative and innovative ways? Will policymakers consider new, "non-traditional" sources -special taxes, immigrant investment flows, collateralized debt proceeds, intellectual property rents -as potential pools of capitalization (e.g. see, Clarke, 2016) ? If so the actors involved in the policy dialog will inevitably expand from the ministries of finance and central banks to other government departments and ministries, such as those engaged in innovation, immigration, stateowned enterprise (SOE) management, and economic development. Finally, returning to Lucas' "puzzle":
How can a capital constrained country in particular use a development-focused fund effectively to increase flows of new investment capital?
Our paper contributes directly to an evolving policy literature on sovereign development and strategic investment, including new funding streams to capitalize SWFs (Gamlen et al, 2016; Hamilton and Atkinson, 2016; Schena and Ali, 2016; Halland et al, 2016; Divakaran et al, 2016; Milhench, 2017) .
A key objective of this analysis is to systematize existing research with a focus on the challenges of what we perceive as a "paradox of scarcity": The creation of SWFs not from surplus wealth, but using scarce capital with competing uses, to overcome market imperfections to catalyze inward investment. Our paper is structured as follows: Part 1 provides a contextual overview. Part 2 presents our thesis of scarcity. Part 3 catalogs the rise of development-focused SWFs and documents sources of capitalization. Part 4 considers in more detail "why capitalization matters" by analyzing the indirect role of remittances in the establishment of SWFs. Part 5 offers several policy considerations when designing new fund structures.
Four Waves of Fund Origination
SWFs are large state investment funds that have become important actors in international finance.
They have traditionally been established to recycle oil/gas revenues or budget and current account surpluses and to mitigate related negative externalities, such as volatile fiscal revenues, Dutch disease, or capital supply shocks (The Economist, 2014) . As a consequence, SWFs -particularly when growing balances during a period of high expected returns -tended to invest primarily in liquid, foreign assets.
Following years of exponential growth, the number and size of SWFs seemed ripe to plateau as traditional drivers of SWF growth -e.g. commodity revenues and current account surpluses -slowed. Instead the volume of SWFs -established, launched, or proposed -has expanded, albeit with a shift in 'form' and 'function' (Clark and Monk, 2010) .
The first wave of SWFs was discretely related to commodity revenue -in particular petrodollarflows, recycling resource revenue surpluses into the international financial system and eventually for reintermediation via western financial institutions. This early evolution benefitted from a global economy characterized by industrialization and liberalization -of capital accounts and trade, which further enhanced oil windfalls. The second wave of SWFs was strongly associated with emerging economies, when countries with persistent trade surpluses -especially in Asia -accelerated accumulation of of foreign reserves and invested in a broad range of assets classes across global markets.
A parallel third wave of SWF evolution involves what have become known as sovereign development funds. These funds have primarily been capitalized with state commercial assets and are represented well by the likes of Temasek in Singapore, Khazanah in Malaysia, Mumtalakat in Bahrain, and Samruk-Kazyna in Kazakhstan. Their objective has been first to improve the management of and -if required -to restructure state assets with the goal of privatizing and monetizing them. This liquidity imperative has contributed directly to the ability of development funds to redeploy capital to advance broader national development goals (Chaturvedi, Brookfield, and Schena, 2010) .
The fourth wave of SWFs -currently accelerating -is focused on broader economic objectives as countries search for innovative ways to mobilize foreign capital and leverage international financial markets to finance economic development and transformation. Recently established funds with development or strategic investment mandates, include those designed to catalyze foreign direct investments into strategic sectors of the host country's domestic economy (Schena and Ali, 2016) .
Examples include Italy's CDP Equity, the Russian Direct Investment Fund, and the Ireland Strategic Investment Fund (Schena and Ali, 2016 
Mandate versus Capitalization: A Paradox of Scarcity?
Whereas creating a SWF was once the exclusive domain of countries with surpluses, excess reserves, or well-established operating assets, more recently -and perhaps paradoxically, modest wealth or even reserve scarcity has not proven a deterrent. Rather fund structures are increasingly advanced as a means to create versus simply manage assets -whether financial or real (Clark and Monk, 2010) . This brings the relationship between mandate and capitalization into sharp relief. It also opens investigation into non-traditional sources of funding such as proceeds from special taxes/levies, flows from immigrant investment programs, intellectual property rents, and even proceeds from collateralized debt issuances.
With respect to taxes, for example, Luxembourg aims to collect at least EUR50mn per year from e-commerce VAT and excise duties to reach EUR1bn over a 20-year period for its "Wealth Fund for
Intergenerational Generations" established in 2015 . This fund was created in order to cover a part of future pension liabilities. Similarly, the Indian government created the National Clean Environment Fund with revenues from an increase in the coal tax (Climate Change News, 2016).
To increase focus on the non-fossil fuel sector, the Indian government doubled the carbon tax on coal.
The revenues from this tax flow into the Fund, which then invests in clean energy projects (Climate Change News, 2016) .
In discussing the importance of intellectual property for national development, Clarke (2016) explores It is not our intent here to suggest that each of the above referenced funds is in fact a SWF. Such a debate is worthy, but beyond the scope of the present discussion. Rather these cases demonstrate the expanding scope of funding sources that are captured and used to support fund mandates and to further discrete policy purposes. It is furthermore important to note that the relationship between the policy objective of the fund and its source of capitalization is not inconsequential -whether special taxes or fees ( e.g. India, Panama and Luxembourg), asset transfers (e.g. Vietnam, Bahrain, Palestine), budgetary or inter-governmental transfers (e.g. Senegal, Italy, Panama, France), or allocations of foreign exchange reserve. Notwithstanding the origin, in cases of economic development mandates, sources of capital and mandates must be effectively linked to insure a stable, dedicated, long-term funding base, whose allocation to development goals does not destabilize other components of the host country's macroeconomy.
ii We return to this point below through the lens of remittance-based reserves to highlight potential vulnerabilities.
The Evolving Fund Landscape for Economic Development
Using SWFs as vehicles to enhance national development, transform industrial sectors, and promote national competitiveness reaches back to the 1970s when Singapore's government sought to decrease SOE dependence on the state budget. To advance this it transferred stakes of Ministry of Finance holdings to Temasek, established in 1974 (Yeung, 2011) . Other ministries followed suit by transferring their assets into holding companies. These included the Sheng-Li Holding (defence-related industries) and the Ministry of National Development Holding (housing development and land corporations). By the early 1980s most of these assets were merged into Temasek (Braunstein, 2015) . As a state holding company, Temasek was expected to increase efficiency and eliminate redundancies through better coordination among Singapore's SOEs, while also serving as a financing conduit for portfolio companies through the issuance of bonds in global markets.
More recently, the notion of transforming SOEs through national holding companies or development or strategic investment funds has experienced a surge with the proliferation of funds proposed, announced or launched. Motivations vary: Slow grow, declining global trade, underperforming state assets, low commodity prices, a persistent infrastructure funding gap, more generally capital constraints, and perhaps too an acknowledgement that populist movements globally may constrict traditional channels of economic cooperation and assistance. Multilateral development institutions have accepted this reality and shifted their policy stance from acquiescence to encouraging and promoting investment funds through capacity building and institutional assistance programs (e.g., see World Bank
Investment Funds for Development, homepage). However, despite their wider acceptance as institutional contributors to the development process, they are not panaceas and inherit the very funding constraints of their governments. Several newly announced cases will serve to illustrate.
In 2016, for example, the Indonesia's government announced the creation of a super holding company which is expected to displace Indonesia's SOE Ministry and absorb 199 of the country's largest
SOEs. The holding company will be modeled after Malaysia's Khazanah Nasional and will reportedly control US$320bn worth of assets by 2019 (Bloomberg, 17 May 2016 . To accelerate the process, the government plans to establish four sector-specific sub-holdings, beginning with the energy sector (Braunstein and Caoili, 2016) . For Indonesia the restructuring of the SOE sector using a holding company model is intended to decrease SOE dependence on the government budget. While improving the overall fiscal climate, this is also expected to contribute to SOE operating efficiency and to eliminate redundancies through improved SOE operating efficiency (Braunstein and Caoili, 2016 Other cases include India which has created a development fund that became operational in 2016.
The National Infrastructure Investment Fund is capitalized not through excess reserves, but rather through a budgetary allocation. Guyana's recent discovery of oil deposits has prompted its government to consider of a multi-fund structure designed at inception to address three objectives: stabilization, savings, and development objectives (Ali and Schena, 2017) . The fund's capitalization has yet to be determined, but would presumably involve transfers from future oil revenues. Similarly recent discoveries of hydrocarbon reserves has prompted the Kenyan Treasury to also initiate study of a wealth fund. Bangladesh also runs persistent deficits on its trade, services and primary income accounts.
Remittance flows are important to insure that its current account remains in surplus. Remittances Armenia also does not have a SWF, but likewise has considered fund structures to address macroeconomic needs. Certainly using foreign reserves that are heavily dependent on remittances from a single country poses significant risks, even beyond those in the case of Bangladesh. Nonetheless establishing a discrete buffer using a portion of exchange reserves designed exclusively for reserve management would be consistent with SWF models established by other post-Soviet republics, including Russia (e.g.
Azerbaijian and Kazakhstan). Specifically such a mandate would require assets to be invested similarly to Central Bank assets in liquid, hard currency securities and accessible to the Central Bank if balance of payments conditions deteriorate or currency conditions require. An extension of this model might also target fiscal pressures resulting specifically from the volatility of commodity prices. With proper attention to its asset base, such a mandate could be capitalized separately by mobilizing a portion of revenues from commodity production or mining. Here Armenia might consider -in parallelestablishing a stabilization fund with a portion of revenues from Armenia's large copper-molybdenum exports.
Given the vulnerability of both reserves and commodity revenues, neither seemingly would serve as a stable base to capitalize a development mandate. An alternative construct might be to transfer state assets into a quasi private equity structure in which the state acts as a capital commitment. However, the means by which Armenia will fund its portion were undisclosed.
Policy Considerations
Through the lens of remittance-based reserves in the cases of Bangladesh and Armenia, we have attempted to isolate the trade-offs of designing investment fund structures as development tools with the need to capitalize them effectively without jeopardizing other key macro-economic objectives, including currency and fiscal stability. SWFs are increasingly serving a broader macro-economic policy agenda. This is clearly reflected in the mandates of newly launched or announced funds, which have ventured well beyond stabilizing budgets and saving for future generations. As new funds target national development and diversification, they must first be properly and sustainably capitalized, then effectively integrated into the overall economic development strategy of countries to contribute to long term economic growth. We return here to the case of Turkey which has transferred state operating assets to the Turkish Wealth Fund reportedly to be used to support a capital acquisition strategy that will fund domestic investment. Unlike Temasek and Khazanah, which, in their formative stages, raised capital as holding companies to support the working capital or investment requirements of their holdings, the Turkish SWF will be established as a "leveraged fund" at its outset. Furthermore, as a result of the asset transfers, annual dividends of SoEs will be diverted from the central budget to the SWF (Intellinews, 2017).
Likewise transfers to the proposed Romanian FDSI will also divert dividends from Romania's central budget raising the specter that FDSI capital might be used to finance government budget deficits (Intellinnews, 2017) . Any such circumstances -as in the case of Turkey or Romania -must prompt a careful review of budgetary impacts, including residual or indirect impacts on sovereign credit quality.
Consider also the role of foreign exchange reserves particularly when constrained or subject to high degrees of volatility. Under any such circumstances, segregating a portion of reserves and transferring their ownership and control to a separate government-owned institution could expose the government and the national economy to liquidity risks and the potential of a balance of payments or currency crisis. Such vulnerability is especially prevalent if the transferred assets are beyond the reach of monetary authorities and the asset allocation strategy of the SWF features high allocations to illiquid assets, such as real estate, infrastructure, and private equity. Reserves transferred to a separate legal entity and invested in assets whose liquidity profile deters prompt and cost-efficient conversion to cash are not "reserves" under current definitions or also may not be considered a component of a conventional liquidity buffer. This could be credit-constraining and destabilizing under conditions of balance of payments or fiscal distress. investment, but warrants careful scrutiny to circumscribe the real risk of unintended consequences.
Conclusion
i A phrased popularized by Gwyneth Paltrow, an actress, in reference to domestic partnership or marriage. Yet, the phrase has taken a life of its own and has been used by academics and policymakers alike in reference to political and economic issues. See for example: https://www.advisorperspectives.com/commentaries/2014/10/07/a-case-of-conscious-uncoupling.pdf.
ii The trade off between maintaining an optimal level of reserves and aligning with macroeconomics and development objectives is an issue confronting Saudi Arabia. In the context of trying to diversify its economy, the oil kingdom is deploying its newly restructured SWF, Public Investment Fund (PIF), along with signing co-investment agreements that would see its capital being invested abroad. See: "Saudi Arabia spends money to make money in foreign investment drive," Reuters, 22 March 2017. http://uk.reuters.com/article/saudi-asia-investment-idUKL5N1GX1BE
iii The rationale behind the creation of a separate entity is driven by having a separate SWF like entities as a means to address regulatory constraints is not new. For example, in the late 1980s, it became clear that Temasek had started to invest on a global basis, including the US. Temasek also started to acquire stakes in banks; however, US legislation at that time forbade industrial holding companies with direct interest in industries to take controlling stakes in banks (Braunstein, 2016) . Therefore, it was necessary to separate bank-related activities from industrial-related investment activities. Consequently it was decided to retain the Ministry of National Development Holdings as a vehicle for the Singapore government's investment in banks (Braunstein, 2016) .
iv http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRGDF/Resources/GDF2003-Chapter7.pdf
